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Abstract
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a
Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information
into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds
to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent
valuations and market prices such that clearing prices become
maximum a posteriori estimates given observed agent valua-
tions. This generative model then forms the basis of an auction
process which alternates between refining estimates of agent
valuations and computing candidate clearing prices. We pro-
vide an implementation of the auction using assumed density
filtering to estimate valuations and expectation maximization
to compute prices. An empirical evaluation over a range of
valuation domains demonstrates that our Bayesian auction
mechanism is highly competitive against the combinatorial
clock auction in terms of rounds to convergence, even under
the most favorable choices of price increment for this baseline.
Introduction
Combinatorial auctions address the problem of allocating
multiple distinct items among agents who may view the items
as complements or substitutes. In such auctions, agents can
place bids on entire packages of items in order to express
complex preferences, leading to higher allocative efficiency.
Nevertheless, bidding in a combinatorial auction places a sub-
stantial cognitive burden on agents, because the process of
valuing even a single bundle can be a costly exercise (Kwas-
nica et al., 2005; Parkes, 2006). There is therefore great
interest in developing iterative combinatorial auctions, which
help to guide the bidding process using price feedback, and
in devising techniques to limit the number of rounds needed
to reach convergence (ideally in the dozens rather than hun-
dreds) (Petrakis, Ziegler, and Bichler, 2012; Bichler, Hao,
and Adomavicius, 2017).
In this work, we propose to incorporate prior information
on agent valuations into the auction procedure in a principled
manner, thereby achieving a low number of rounds in prac-
tice. We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design
in a Bayesian framework by developing a joint generative
model of agent valuations and market prices. Our generative
model defines a likelihood function for clearing prices given
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agent valuations. If these valuations are observed, the maxi-
mum a posteriori (MAP) estimate for prices corresponds to
market clearing prices. If they remain latent, valuations can
be marginalized away, weighed by their own likelihood ac-
cording to observed bids. This forms the basis for an auction
scheme to solve the more general clearing problem where
valuations are unknown.
We consider settings where several indivisible items are up
for sale, and agents have super-additive valuation functions
over bundles of items (i.e., the items are pure complements).
We provide an auction implementation using item prices con-
sisting of two components. In the knowledge update compo-
nent, we maintain a Gaussian posterior over agent valuations,
which is updated as new bids are placed using assumed den-
sity filtering (Opper and Winther, 1998). Prior information
can be incorporated into the auction by suitably initializing
this component. The knowledge update step presumes that
agents follow myopic best-response strategies and bid on
utility-maximizing bundles at each round. Accordingly, we
discuss an extension to our auction scheme using multiple
price trajectories that incentivizes this behavior in ex post
Nash equilibrium. In the price update component, we ob-
tain an analytical expression for the clearing price objective,
based on the Gaussian model of valuations that the auction
maintains. We establish that the form of the objective is suit-
able for optimization using expectation maximization. By
alternating the two components, we obtain an intuitive and
tractable auction scheme where agents place bids, knowledge
over latent valuations is updated given bids, and prices are
updated given current knowledge of valuations.
For evaluation purposes, we first illustrate our auction on
a stylized instance to gain insight into the auction’s behav-
ior under both unbiased and biased prior information. We
then conduct simulation experiments to compare our auc-
tion implementation against a combinatorial clock auction
that updates prices according to excess demand, which is
the standard price update scheme used in practice (Ausubel
and Baranov, 2014). The prior information in our Bayesian
auction is obtained by fitting a Gaussian process prior on
a training sample of valuations. The baseline clock auction
is parametrized by a step size, or price increment. We find
in our experiments that our Bayesian auction is competitive
against the strongest possible version of the baseline auction,
where the price increment is chosen separately for each in-
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stance to lead to the fewest possible rounds. In particular,
the Bayesian auction almost matches the strongest possible
version of baseline auction in terms of number of instances
cleared, and uses fewer rounds on average when it is able to
clear.
Preliminaries
We consider a setting with m distinct and indivisible items,
held by a single seller. The items are to be allocated among
n agents (i.e., buyers). We will use the notation [n] =
{1, . . . , n}, so that [n] and [m] denote the index sets of agents
and items, respectively. There is unit supply of each item. A
bundle is a subset of the set of items. We associate each bun-
dle with its indicator vector, and denote the set of bundles
as X = {0, 1}m. The component-wise inequality x ≤ x′
therefore means that bundle x is contained in bundle x′. The
empty bundle is denoted by ∅.
Each agent i is single-minded so that its valuation can be
encoded via a pair (xi, wi) where xi ∈ X is a bundle and
wi ∈ R+ is a non-negative value (i.e., willingness to pay) for
the bundle. The agent’s valuation function vi : X → R+ is
defined as vi(x) = wi if x ≥ xi, and vi(x) = 0 otherwise. In
words, the agent only derives positive value if it acquires all
the items in xi (which are therefore complements), and any
further item is superfluous. Our auction and results all extend
to agents with OR valuations, which are concise representa-
tions of super-additive valuations (Nisan, 2000).1 This is due
to the fact that an agent with an OR valuation will behave
and bid in our auction exactly like a set of single-minded
agents, under myopic best-response (Parkes, 1999). Under
super-additive valuations, items are pure complements, and
complementarities are a key motivation for using package
bidding. For the sake of simplicity, however, we limit the
exposition to single-minded agents.
An allocation is represented as a vector of bundles y =
(y1, . . . , yn), listing the bundle that each agent obtains (pos-
sibly ∅). An allocation is feasible if the listed bundles are
pairwise disjoint (i.e., each item is allocated to at most one
agent). We denote the set of feasible allocations by F . The
purpose of running a combinatorial auction is to find an
efficient allocation of the items to the agents, meaning an
allocation that maximizes the total value to the agents.2
More formally, a feasible allocation y ∈ F is efficient if
y ∈ arg maxy′∈F
∑
i∈[n] vi(y
′
i). However, an iterative auc-
tion proceeds via a price adjustment process, so prices will be
our central object of study, rather than allocations. The allo-
cation in an iterative auction is adjusted according to agents’
responses to prices.
1More formally, an OR valuation takes the form v(x) =
max{v1(x1) + v2(x2) : x1 + x2 = x, x1 ∧ x2 = 0}, where
v1 and v2 are themselves OR valuations or single-minded.
2This is in contrast to the goal of maximizing revenue. In auction
design, one typically begins with an efficient auction, which is then
modified (e.g., using reserve prices) to achieve optimal revenue (My-
erson, 1981). We therefore consider the problem of designing an
efficient auction as more fundamental.
Clearing Prices In the context of a combinatorial auction,
we encode prices as a non-negative function θ : X → R+
over the bundles. We assume that prices are normalized and
monotone: θ(∅) = 0, and θ(x) ≤ θ(x′) if x ≤ x′. An
iterative auction adjusts prices to balance demand and supply.
To formalize this notion, we need several additional concepts.
We assume that agents have quasi-linear utility, so that the
utility to agent i of obtaining bundle x at prices θ is vi(x)−
θ(x). The indirect utility function provides the maximum
utility that agent i can achieve, when faced with prices θ, by
choosing among bundles from X :
Vi(θ) = max { vi(x)− θ(x) : x ∈ X } . (1)
Note that for single-minded agents, the indirect utility re-
duces to Vi(θ;xi, wi) = (wi − θ(xi))+, where the notation
(a)+ = max{a, 0} refers to the positive part of the argument.
It will sometimes be useful to make explicit the parametriza-
tion of the indirect utility on the agent’s type (xi, wi), as
we have just done. The demand set of agent i is defined as
Di(θ) = {x ∈ X : vi(x)− θ(x) = Vi(θ)}. Similarly, the in-
direct revenue function provides the maximum revenue that
the seller can achieve, when faced with prices θ, by selecting
among feasible allocations:
R(θ) = max
∑
i∈[n]
θ(yi) : y ∈ F
 . (2)
The seller’s supply set consists of the feasible allocations
that maximize revenue: S(θ) = {y ∈ F : ∑i∈[n] θ(yi) =
R(θ)}.
We say that prices θ are clearing prices if there is a feasible
allocation y such that, at prices θ, the seller’s revenue is
maximized, and each agent’s utility is maximized. Formally,
we require the following conditions: y ∈ S(θ) and yi ∈
Di(θ) for all i ∈ [n]. We say that the clearing prices θ support
allocation y.
It is a standard result that the set of allocations supported
by any given clearing prices θ coincides with the set of effi-
cient allocations. (This is a special case of the Fundamental
Theorems of Welfare Economics (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green, 1995, 16.C–D).) Moreover, Bikhchandani and Ostroy
(2002) have shown that clearing prices exist and coincide with
the minimizers of the following objective function, which
corresponds to the linear programming dual of the problem
of allocating the items efficiently:∑
i∈[n]
Vi(θ) +R(θ). (3)
This is a piece-wise linear, convex function of the price func-
tion θ. Importantly, this result is guaranteed to hold only
if the prices are an unrestricted function over the bundles
(except for non-negativity and normalization). In practice,
it is common to use certain parametrizations for the prices.
For instance, taking θ(x) = p · x for some vector p ∈ Rm+
corresponds to using linear prices (i.e., item prices). These
parametrizations may not achieve the unrestricted minimum
in (3); in particular, linear clearing prices may not exist. We
Knowledge
update
Price
update
Initial 
prices
Observe
demand/
supply
Output
allocation
Does 
demand
meet 
supply?
yes
no
Figure 1: Bayesian iterative auction.
will use unrestricted prices in the development of our auc-
tion, and postpone the question of price parametrization until
needed to achieve a practical implementation.
It is useful to view (3) as a potential function that quantifies
how close prices θ are to supporting an efficient allocation.
Indeed, if some prices achieve a value of (3) that differs
from the optimum by an additive error of δ, then the agents
(and seller) can be induced to accept an efficient trade using
transfers totaling δ. In the following, we will therefore refer
to the function
U(θ;v) = exp
−∑
i∈[n]
Vi(θ)−R(θ)
 (4)
as the clearing potential for the valuation profile v =
(v1, ..., vn), which will capture, in a formal sense, how likely
a price function θ is to clearing valuation profile v.
Iterative Auction and Incentives The goal of our paper
is to design an iterative auction that exploits the auction-
eer’s prior knowledge over agent valuations in order to speed
up the clearing process. The auction proceeds over rounds.
Agents report their demand at the current prices and, if the
market is not cleared, the information provided by the agents
is used to update the knowledge about their valuations. Can-
didate clearing prices are computed based on the updated
knowledge, and the procedure iterates. A schematic represen-
tation of the auction process is presented in Figure 1. The
knowledge update and price update components constitute
the core of the auction that must be implemented.
The correctness of our auction relies on the agents follow-
ing a strategy of myopic best-response bidding, meaning that
each agent bids on a utility-maximizing bundle at each round.
There is evidence that myopic bidding may be a reasonable
assumption in practice. For instance, in the FCC broadband
spectrum auction, jump bids were the exception (Cramton,
1997). Nonetheless, a robust auction design should incen-
tivize agents to follow the appropriate strategies. For this
purpose, we can use an extension of our auction that main-
tains n + 1 price trajectories in order to compute clearing
prices when all agents are present, and when each agent is
removed in turn. This allows one to compute final VCG pay-
ments and bring myopic best-response bidding into an ex post
Nash equilibrium (Gul and Stacchetti, 2000; Bikhchandani
and Ostroy, 2006). The technique of using multiple trajec-
tories was previously used by Ausubel (2006) and Mishra
and Parkes (2007) among others. We will provide a more
precise treatment of incentives in the formal description of
our auction mechanism.
Generative Model
The purpose of this section is to define a probabilistic rela-
tionship between prices and valuations that will allow us to
use the auctioneer’s prior knowledge over valuations to make
inferences over clearing prices. We write w = (w1, . . . , wn)
and x = (x1, . . . , xn) for the vectors of agents’ values and
bundles, and denote the probabilistic model as P (x,w, θ).
Below, our convention is that Q refers to distributions—
possibly unnormalized—that form the building blocks of
the generative model, whereas P refers to the normalized dis-
tribution resulting from the generative model. We represent
the prior knowledge of the auctioneer over agent valuations
via the probability density function Q(w) =
∏
i∈[n]Q(wi).
The structure of our probability model is inspired by the
work of Sollich (2002), who provides a Bayesian interpre-
tation of the support vector machine (SVM) objective. To
establish a proper relationship between prices and valuations,
the key is to require that
P (x,w, θ) ∝ U(θ;x,w)Q(w), (5)
where U(θ;x,w) is the clearing potential introduced in (4),
adapted to single-minded valuations. Under this joint proba-
bility model, we have that the posterior probability of prices
θ takes the form
P (θ | x,w) ∝ U(θ;x,w). (6)
Therefore, the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate maxi-
mizes U(θ;x,w), or equivalently minimizes (3), and corre-
sponds to clearing prices.
To establish that a probability model of the form (5) is
possible—namely, that it can indeed be normalized—we will
derive it as the result of a generative model. This process may
be of independent interest as a means of generating agents
together with market prices.
1. Draw prices θ according to Q(θ) ∝ exp [−R(θ)] .
2. For each agent i ∈ [n]:
– Draw wi ∈ R+ from Q(wi).
– Draw xi ∈ X from
Q(xi | wi, θ) = 1
2m
exp [−Vi(θ;xi, wi)] .
– With probability 1−ν(wi, θ), restart from step 1, where
ν(w, θ) =
∑
x∈X
Q(x | w, θ).
Above, we must ensure that the Q(θ) prior normalizes; this is
the case under our assumption that the domain of θ falls
within the positive orthant. The prior distribution Q(wi)
on value wi is left free in the model, so that it may cor-
respond to the auctioneer’s prior in practice. Note that the
bundle likelihood Q(xi | wi, θ) is not normalized; because
Vi(θ;xi, wi) ≥ 0, summing over the set of bundles leads to
the aggregate probability mass ν(wi, θ) ≤ 1. Rather than nor-
malizing by this quantity, we use the “remaining probability”
1− ν(wi, θ) of not drawing any bundle to restart the process.
Because of the possible restart, the agent types (bundle-value
pairs) and clearing prices are not independent in the overall
generative distribution. In particular, the number of agents n
in the economy affects the distribution of prices.
The following proposition confirms that our model satisfies
(5). All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Proposition 1. The generative model of agent types and
prices takes the form
P (x,w, θ) ∝ U(θ;x,w)Q(w). (7)
The generative process defines a probability distribution over
prices once valuations are observed, but during the auction
the valuations remain latent, and must be inferred based on
observed bids placed across rounds. Under appropriate in-
centives, the auctioneer can infer valuations assuming that
the agents follow myopic best-response bidding. However, if
there are any bidding errors or corruption in communication,
assuming exact best-response can cause singularities in the
inference process (e.g., there may be no valuation consistent
with all observed bids). To guard against this, our mecha-
nism will integrate bids as if they were generated from the
following stochastic model: Let bi ∈ {−1,+1} be an indi-
cator variable to denote whether the agent bids on bundle
xi (bi = +1) or not (bi = −1); the latter is equivalent to
bidding on ∅. If the cost of bundle xi is ci, then the choice of
bid follows the probability distribution
Q(bi = +1 | ci, wi) ∝ Φ(β(wi − ci)), (8)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the stan-
dard normal, and β > 0 is a scalar parameter. This is known
as the probit variant of approximate best-response, which
arises from random utility models (Train, 2009). As β →∞,
we obtain exact best-response: the agent bids on xi if and
only if this bundle yields positive utility under bundle cost
ci. Using a large (but finite) β allows the auctioneer to model
agents as essentially following a best-response strategy, but
occasionally allowing for bidding errors or inconsistencies.
Auction Description
Our auction proceeds over rounds; we use k to denote the cur-
rent round, and ` to index the rounds up to k. At each round,
prices are updated, which imputes a cost to each agent’s
bundle. Let c`i be the cost of agent i’s desired bundle xi in
round ` according to the current prices. The prices at each
round should not be confused with the latent clearing prices
θ, which we are trying to compute as a MAP estimate of the
generative model. Given its value wi and the bundle cost c`i ,
agent i places bid b`i ∈ {−1,+1} in round `.
We write c` = (c`1, . . . , c
`
n) to denote the vector of bundle
costs in round `, and c(`) = (c1, . . . , c`) to denote the vector
of costs up to round `. For brevity we also write c = c(k) to
denote the vector of all costs up to the current round. We use
the notation b`, b(`), and b to denote the analogous vectors
of bids. The bundle costs and agent bids in a round depend
on the current prices, which themselves depend on the bids
placed in all earlier rounds. Assuming that the first round
prices are zero, we have the following intuitive posterior over
bids and costs.
Lemma 1. The posterior distribution over bids and costs
placed during the auction, given the generated prices and
agent types, is given by
P (b, c |x,w, θ) = Q(b |c,w)
k∏
`=1
P (c` |b(`−1), c(`−1),x),
where b` and c` are the vectors of agent bids and costs at
round `, and b(`) and c(`) are the vectors of agent bids and
costs up to round `.
We see that the posterior over bids and costs does not de-
pend on the underlying clearing prices θ, conditional on agent
types (x,w), because the initial prices and agent valuations
fully determine how the auction proceeds. More specifically,
the posterior decomposes into the likelihood of the observed
bids Q(b | c,w) under stochastic model (8), times the likeli-
hood of the observed sequence of costs. The latter does not
involve w, because current round prices are fully determined
by the bids and costs of previous rounds. Our auction is based
on the following characterization of the overall posterior over
prices and agent values.
Proposition 2. The posterior distribution of latent variables
(w, θ) given observed variables (b, c,x) takes the form
P (w, θ | b, c,x) ∝ Q(b | c,w)Q(w) ·Q(x |w, θ)Q(θ),
where the proportionality constant depends solely on
(b, c,x).
The posterior factors into two terms, which motivates our
auction procedure. The first term, Q(b | c,w)Q(w), can be
construed as a posterior over agent values given bids and
costs, since Q(w) corresponds to a prior and Q(b | c,w) cor-
responds to a likelihood. We will maintain an approximation
Pˆ (w) to this posterior over agent values and update it as
new bids are placed in response to bundle costs. This is the
knowledge update component.
Recalling (6), the second term Q(x | w, θ)Q(θ) ∝
U(θ;x,w) in the posterior corresponds (up to a constant
factor) to the price posterior given knowledge of agent types.
This leads to an approximation to the price posterior when
values remain latent:
P (θ | b, c,x) ≈
∫
dw Pˆ (w) ·Q(x |w, θ)Q(θ). (9)
Here we have simply integrated the full posterior as given by
Proposition 2, and made use of our approximation to the value
posterior. (We have also omitted the normalization constant.)
In the context of an auction, we quote a specific price function
to the agents, rather than a distribution over prices. Therefore,
in the price update component, we will compute and quote
the MAP estimate of prices by maximizing (9). Note that
if we have exact knowledge of agent values (i.e., Pˆ is a
point mass), computing the MAP estimate is equivalent to
minimizing (3) and to computing clearing prices, as one
would expect.
Knowledge Update We observe that the value posterior
Q(b|c,w)Q(w) consists of a separate factor for each agent i,
taking the form Q(wi)
∏k
`=1Q(b
`
i | c`i , wi), where k is the
current round. This represents a posterior on agent i’s indi-
vidual value wi. To obtain an approximation to this posterior,
we use an online scheme known as assumed density filtering,
which is a special case of expectation propagation (Cow-
ell, Dawid, and Sebastiani, 1996; Minka, 2001; Opper and
Winther, 1998). Under this approach, a Gaussian distribu-
tion Pˆ (wi;mi, σ2i ) is used to approximate the posterior; its
mean mi and variance σ2i are updated at each round given
the bidding observations. The Gaussian is initially set to ap-
proximate the prior Q(wi) via moment matching: mi and σ2i
are set to the mean and variance of this prior Q. In each later
round ` = 1, . . . , k the posterior is again updated by match-
ing the moments of Q(b`i | c`i , wi)Pˆ (wi;mi, σ2i ), which is an
online update. Using moment matching as an approximation
is justified by the fact that it corresponds to minimizing the
Kullback-Leibler divergence KL(Q‖Pˆ ) under the constraint
that Pˆ is Gaussian.
Due to the form of the likelihood (8) and the fact that Pˆ
is Gaussian, the update has a closed-form solution (see
Williams and Rasmussen, 2006, p. 74):
mi ← mi + b
`
i σ
2
i βN (zi)√
1 + σ2i β
2 Φ(zi)
σ2i ← σ2i −
σ4i β
2N (zi)
1 + σ2i β
2Φ(zi)
(
zi +
N (zi)
Φ(zi)
)
,
where N and Φ are the probability density and cumulative
distribution functions of the standard normal, respectively,
and where zi = b`i β(mi − c`i)/
√
1 + σ2i β
2. Recall that β is
a positive parameter characterizing the extent to which the
auctioneer assumes that agents make mistakes in placing best-
response bids. Since β is positive, the mean mi is updated in
the direction of the bid b`i . On the other hand, the variance
σ2i is strictly decreasing, thus ensuring that the beliefs over
bidder values converge to a point mass in the limit as the
rounds progress, and that the auction converges to a final
vector of prices.
Price Update To implement the price update component
we need an algorithm to maximize the approximate poste-
rior (9). This posterior factors into Q(θ) and a term for each
agent i, which we denote as
Li(θ) =
∫
dwi Pˆi(wi;mi, σ
2
i )Q(xi | wi, θ).
Because Qi(xi | wi, θ) has an exponential form, and Pˆi is
a Gaussian, this integral has a closed form solution (see
appendix). Let qi ∈ {0, 1} be a binary auxiliary variable. We
have Li(θ) =
∑1
qi=0
Li(θ, qi), where we define
Li(θ, 1) = Φ
(
mi − θ(xi)
σi
− σi
)
exp
[
θ(xi)−mi + σ
2
i
2
]
,
Li(θ, 0) = Φ
(
θ(xi)−mi
σi
)
.
Here Φ is again the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal. To summarize, taking the log of (9), the
objective we seek to maximize with respect to θ is
logQ(θ) +
∑
i∈[n]
log
1∑
qi=0
Li(θ, qi). (10)
Now, because Φ is log-concave, both Li(θ, 0) and Li(θ, 1)
are log-concave in θ. Ignoring the first term for an instant,
we see that the objective consists of a sum of mixtures Li(θ)
of log-concave functions for each agent. This kind of ob-
jective is well-suited to optimization using the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin,
1977). The qi amount to “latent” variables and the “marginal”
likelihood appears within the objective (10). (However, we do
not claim any intuitive interpretation for the latent qi—they
are simply used to fit the objective into the mold of EM.)
The remaining term is logQ(θ), which is −R(θ) up to
an additive constant. Recalling the definition of the seller’s
indirect utility (2), we see that this term is very complex
for unrestricted θ, because the set of feasible allocations F
has a very complicated structure. To address this we will
impose a linear structure on prices: θ(x) = p · x where
p ∈ Rm+ denote item prices. With this parametrization, we
have R(θ) =
∑m
j=1 pj , because any allocation that allocates
all the items maximizes revenue under linear prices. The
logQ(θ) term therefore becomes a linear term in p, which is
straightforward to incorporate within the EM algorithm.
Incentive Compatibility Our auction converges to an ef-
ficient allocation and clearing prices under myopic best-
response bidding, but to ensure that agents follow such a
strategy, they must be incentivized to do so. The standard
technique used to achieve this in the literature on iterative
auctions is to charge VCG payments upon completion (Gul
and Stacchetti, 2000; Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2006). But
whereas VCG payments (together with an efficient allocation)
induce truthful bidding in dominant strategies for single-shot
auctions, weaker results hold for iterative auctions.
A strategy profile constitutes an ex post Nash equilibrium
if no agent would like to deviate from its strategy, holding the
others’ strategies fixed, even with knowledge of the private
valuations of the other agents. Gul and Stacchetti (2000)
prove the following result:
Theorem 1 (Gul and Stacchetti, 2000). Truthful myopic best-
response bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium in an itera-
tive auction that myopically-implements the VCG outcome.
Above, the VCG outcome refers to an efficient allocation
along with VCG payments, and an auction myopically-
implements this outcome if the auction converges to it under
myopic best-response bidding. The reason that truthfulness
only holds in ex post Nash equilibrium, rather than dominant
strategies, is that profitable deviations may exist if another
agent bids in a manner inconsistent with any valuation.
Our auction already computes the efficient allocation under
these conditions by virtue of converging to clearing prices.
To compute VCG payments, we can simply extend or auc-
tion drawing on the idea of multiple price trajectories: the
usual trajectory traced by our auction, and the trajectories
that would result if each agent were removed in turn. This
technique was previously used by Ausubel (2006) and Mishra
and Parkes (2007). In this extended design, at each round,
agents place bids against n+ 1 different price vectors. Upon
completion, the agents place last-and-final bids for their al-
located bundles, thereby communicating their value for the
allocations; importantly, agents do not need to communicate
values for any bundles they did not win. This information
is precisely what is needed to compute VCG payments (see,
e.g., Parkes and Ungar, 2000).
Empirical Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our Bayesian auction design with
two different kinds of experiments: a small experiment to
illustrate the behavior of our auction under biased and un-
biased prior information, and a larger-scale experiment to
compare our auction against a competitive baseline.
Our simulations are conducted in Matlab. In all our experi-
ments, we assume that agents best respond to the proposed
prices (i.e., they always bid on their most profitable bundle),
and that the auctioneer considers their bids as if they were
generated from the response model presented in (8) with
β = 10. However, simulations where real bids follows (8)
with β = 4 provide results similar to the ones presented. For
the price update, the objective (10) is maximized using the
“active-set” algorithm in Matlab. To avoid numerical singu-
larities we place a lower bound of 0.01 on the variance of
valuation estimates.
LLG Experiments We consider an instance of the Local-
Local-Global (LLG) domain (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006),
which has been considered several times in the combinatorial
auctions literature. There are two items and three single-
minded agents. Two of the agents are local, meaning that
they are interested in just one item, respectively the first and
second item. The last agent is global in the sense that it is
interested in both items.
The two local agents have a value of 4 for their respective
items, and the global one has a value of 10 for both. The
items are efficiently allocated when they are both assigned to
the global agent, and linear prices are expressive enough to
clear the market (e.g., we can use a price of 4 for each item).
We assume that the auctioneer has accurate knowledge of
the local agents’ values: Q(w1) = N (w1;m1 = 4, σ21 =
0.01) and Q(w2) = N (w2;m2 = 4, σ22 = 0.01). Note the
very low variance, reflecting certainty. We test how different
kinds of prior knowledge over the global agent’s value affect
the number of rounds that the Bayesian auction takes to
clear the market. In the first case we assume unbiased prior
knowledge: m3 = 10. In the second case we assume that it is
biased below: m3 = 4. Here, the auctioneer tends to allocate
to the local agents instead of the global one.
Figure 2 plots the number of rounds that our Bayesian
auction takes to clear the market against the variance σ23
of the prior over the global agent’s value. We see that, in
the unbiased scenario, the number of rounds monotonically
increases as the variance grows. This can be easily explained
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Figure 2: Auction rounds in LLG.
since increasing the variance only adds noise to the exact
prior estimate. In the biased scenario, we have an optimal
range of variances between 8 and 16. If the variance is too low,
the auction needs many observations to correct the biased
prior. If it is too high, the low confidence leads to many
rounds because the auctioneer needs to refine its estimate of
the value regardless of the bias.
CATS Experiments For our second set of experiments,
we generate instances using the Combinatorial Auction
Test Suite (CATS), which offers four generator distribu-
tions: paths, regions, arbitrary, and scheduling
(Leyton-Brown, Pearson, and Shoham, 2000). These are
meant to model realistic domains such as truck routes, real
estate, and pollution rights. We generate 1000 instances from
each distribution, each with 12 items and 10 single-minded
agents.
The instances are generated as follows. First, 100 input
files with 1000 bids each are generated. Each input file is par-
titioned into a “training set” and “test set”, each with 500 bids.
From the test set, 10 bids (representing 10 single-minded
agents) are sampled uniformly at random. The training set
is used to fit the prior knowledge of our Bayesian auction.
Specifically, we fit a linear regression model of bundle value
according to items contained, using a Gaussian process with
a linear covariance function, leading to Gaussian prior knowl-
edge. The fit is performed using the publicly available GPML
Matlab code (Williams and Rasmussen, 2006).
As a baseline we implemented a standard linear-price
auction scheme closely related to the combinatorial clock
auction (Ausubel and Baranov, 2014). The scheme is
parametrized by a positive step size τ . At each round `, the
price of an item is incremented by its excess demand, scaled
by τ/
√
`. The excess demand of an item is the number of
bidded bundles that contain it, minus the number of units
of the item offered by the seller at current prices. This can
be viewed as a subgradient descent method for computing
clearing prices, for which a step size proportional to 1/
√
`
yields the optimal worst-case convergence rate (Bertsekas,
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2015, Chap. 3).
Both the Bayesian auction and the baseline subgradient
auction use linear prices, but these may not be expressive
enough to support an efficient allocation in instances gen-
erated by CATS. We therefore set a limit of 100 rounds for
each auction run, and record reaching this limit as a failure
to clear the market.
On each instance we run a single Bayesian auction, and
100 subgradient auctions with the step size uniformly span-
ning the interval from zero to the maximum agent value. This
leads to several baseline results. The standard instance opti-
mized (SIO) results refer to the performance of the baseline
when using the optimal step size for each instance. The stan-
dard average clearing-optimized (SAOc) results refer to the
performance of the baseline under the fixed step size that
leads to the best clearing performance on average, for each
valuation domain. Analogously, the standard average round-
optimized (SAOr) results refer to baseline performance under
the step size leading to lowest average number of rounds. For
each instance, the step size that leads to the lowest number of
rounds naturally leads to the best clearing rate. But the fixed
step sizes that optimize these two criteria on average may be
different. Note that SIO is an extremely competitive baseline,
since it is optimized for each instance; a priori, we hoped to
be competitive against it, but did not expect to beat it. The
SAOc and SAOr baselines reflect more realistic performance
that could be achieved in practice.
We first consider clearing performance. The results are
reported in Figure 3. We find that the Bayesian auction is
competitive with SIO on all four domains, and that it always
outperforms SAOc. In fact, our auction even outperforms SIO
on the arbitrary domain. This means that it was able to
clear some instances that the subgradient auction could not
clear within 100 rounds at any step size. In general, there is
good agreement between our Bayesian auction and the base-
lines on which instances can be cleared or not according to
the 100-round criterion. This indicates that failure to clear is
typically a property of the instance rather than the algorithm.
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Figure 4: Auction rounds in CATS.
Figure 4 summarizes the distributions of rounds needed to
achieve clearing using box plots. To enable fair comparisons,
for this plot we only considered instances that were cleared by
all auction types: the Bayesian auction, SAOr, and SIO. This
yields 770 valid instances for paths, 910 for regions,
624 for arbitrary and 955 for scheduling. The mean
rounds for the Bayesian auction, SAOr, and SIO are always
statistically different at the 0.01 level. We see from the plot
that, in terms of the median number of rounds, the Bayesian
auction clearly outperforms SAOr, but also remarkably out-
performs SIO. Furthermore, the distribution of rounds for the
Bayesian auction has a much lower spread than the baselines.
It is able to clear almost all instances in less than 10 rounds.
Conclusion
In this work we developed a Bayesian clearing mechanism for
combinatorial auctions that allows one to incorporate prior
information into the auction process in a principled manner.
Our auction mechanism is based on a joint generative model
of valuations and prices such that clearing prices are the MAP
estimate given observed valuations. Our empirical evaluation
confirmed that our Bayesian mechanism performs remarkably
well against a conventional clock auction scheme, in terms
of rounds to convergence. Our auction’s performance simply
relies on reasonable priors for valuations, rather than careful
tuning of price increments.
We believe that the Bayesian perspective on auction de-
sign developed in this paper could be leveraged to improve
other aspects beyond rounds to convergence. For instance, the
Bayesian paradigm offers a principled way to select hyperpa-
rameters (MacKay, 1992); in our context, this could be used
to choose the right structure of prices (linear, nonlinear) to
clear the market, a priori. The knowledge update component
could also form the basis of more refined activity rules; for
instance, one could reject bids that are highly unlikely, given
the valuation posterior based on previous bids. We intend to
pursue these directions in future work.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let ν(w, θ) =
∏
i ν(wi, θ) and Q(w) =
∏
iQ(wi).
We denote the probability of a restart as
r = 1−
∫ ∫
dw dθ ν(w, θ)Q(w)Q(θ), (11)
where dθ is a shorthand for
∏
x∈X dθ(x). (Note that any
price function θ can be seen as a 2m-dimensional vector
of positive real numbers.) The probability that (x,w, θ) is
drawn after ` restarts will then be
P (x,w, θ, `) = Q(x |w, θ)Q(w)Q(θ) · r`. (12)
Thus,
P (x,w, θ) =
∞∑
`=0
Q(x |w, θ)Q(w)Q(θ) · r`
=
Q(x |w, θ)Q(w)Q(θ)
1− r .
(13)
Recalling equation (4), we have that
U(θ;x,w) ∝ Q(x |w, θ)Q(θ). (14)
We can conclude that
P (x,w, θ) ∝ U(θ;x,w)Q(w). (15)
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof.
P (b, c | x,w, θ) =
k∏
`=1
P (b`, c` | b(`−1), c(`−1),x,w, θ)
=
k∏
`=1
Q(b` | c`,w)P (c` | b(`−1), c(`−1),x)
= Q(b | c,w)
k∏
`=1
P (c` | b(`−1), c(`−1),x)
The third line follows because bids only depend on bundle
costs and values according to (8), and costs are independent
of values and clearing prices given previous round bids and
costs, which fully determine the current round prices.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We have that
P (w, θ | b, c,x) ∝ P (b, c | x,w, θ)P (x,w, θ)
∝ Q(b | c,w)P (x,w, θ)
∝ Q(b | c,w)Q(x |w, θ)Q(w)Q(θ).
The second line follows from Lemma 1, and the last line from
Proposition 1.
Price Likelihood Derivation
We aim to solve the integral∫
dwi Pˆi(wi;mi, σ
2
i )Q(xi | wi, θ) =
1
2m
∫
dwiN (wi|mi, σ2i ) exp [−(wi − θ(xi))+],
where N (wi|mi, σ2i ) is the probability density function of
the normal distribution with mean mi and variance σ2i . We
can rewrite the integral as
1
2m
∫ +∞
θ(xi)
dwiN (wi|mi, σ2i ) exp [−(wi − θ(xi))] +
1
2m
∫ θ(xi)
−∞
dwiN (wi|mi, σ2i ).
Now, since
N (wi|mi, σ2i ) exp [−(wi − θ(xi))] =
N (wi|mi − σ2i , σ2i ) exp [−(mi − σ2i /2− θ(xi))],
and given that Φ(−z) = 1−Φ(z), we can rewrite our integral
as
1
2m
Φ
(
mi − θ(xi)
σi
− σi
)
exp
[
θ(xi)−mi + σ
2
i
2
]
+
1
2m
Φ
(
θ(xi)−mi
σi
)
.
